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and other events into the Congress week.
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Foreword from the Symposium Chairs
At the AISB convention 2010 in Leicester, the multidisciplinary symposiumMath-
ematical Practice and Cognition welcomed researchers into mathematical practice
from cognitive science, philosophy, psychology, computational linguistics and
robotics. In this second symposium of the series, we continue the trend. This
volume includes work in the philosophy, history and sociology of mathematics, as
well as argumentation theory, artificial intelligence and computer science.
In the first paper, Andrew Aberdein argues that proof consists of the twin
elements of informal argumentation, whose goal is to persuade fellow mathemati-
cians of a result, and rigorous proof, consisting of valid mathematical inferences.
He then uses this distinction to suggest that different positions on the foundations
of mathematics and in theories of mathematical practice can be seen as different
positions on the admissibility of steps to each of these two elements. In the sec-
ond paper, Manfred Kerber, Christoph Lange and Colin Rowat present their work
on representing and proving theorems in economics, in particular their applica-
tion of mechanised theorem proving tools to a class of economic problems for
which very few general tools currently exist. Thirdly, Alison Pease and Ursula
Martin use Turing’s famous question “Can machines think?” as a starting point
for a thought experiment about the question “Can machines do mathematics?”,
analysing an online mathematical discussion with a view to asking how machines
could ever contribute to such a discussion. Alan Smaill argues, in the fourth paper,
that the two distinctly different proposals for the choice of connectives in linear
logic show the influence of different mathematical analogies at work. Finally,
Sandra Visokolskis combines philosophy with the history of mathematics, giving
an account of the sudden emergence of some mathematical results, characterising
discovery in mathematics as an active and experiential process.
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The Parallel Structure of Mathematical Reasoning
Andrew Aberdein
Abstract. This paper proposes an account of mathematical reason-
ing as parallel in structure: the arguments which mathematicians use
to persuade each other of their results comprise the argumentational
structure; the inferential structure is composed of derivations which
offer a formal counterpart to these arguments. Some conflicts about
the foundations of mathematics correspond to disagreements over
which steps should be admissible in the inferential structure. Sim-
ilarly, disagreements over the admissibility of steps in the argumen-
tational structure correspond to different views about mathematical
practice. The latter steps may be analysed in terms of argumentation
schemes. Three broad types of scheme are distinguished, a distinc-
tion which is then used to characterize and evaluate four contrasting
approaches to mathematical practice.
1 Structures of Mathematical Reasoning
Many mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics have ob-
served the dual nature of mathematical proof: proofs must be both
persuasive and rigorous. Here is G. H. Hardy:
If we were to push it to its extreme we should be led to a
rather paradoxical conclusion; that we can, in the last analy-
sis, do nothing but point; that proofs are what Littlewood and
I call gas, rhetorical flourishes designed to affect psychology,
pictures on the board in the lecture, devices to stimulate the
imagination of pupils. . . . On the other hand it is not disputed
that mathematics is full of proofs, of undeniable interest and
importance, whose purpose is not in the least to secure convic-
tion. Our interest in these proofs depends on their formal and
aesthetic properties. Our object is both to exhibit the pattern
and to obtain assent. [17, 18, his emphasis]
It follows from this account that ‘proof’ is ambiguous between two
different activities: ‘exhibiting the pattern’ and ‘obtaining assent’. In
most circumstances both activities must be satisfactorily performed
for the proof to be a success. There are some special cases, such
as proofs that have been fully formalized, or have been reified as
mathematical objects, where only the first activity is attempted. But
in the characteristic sense of ‘proof’ we need more than this; we need
a dialectical interaction with the mathematical community.
For Richard Epstein, proofs intended to obtain assent are argu-
ments by means of which mathematicians convince each other that
the corresponding inferences are valid. He represents this situation
schematically (Fig. 1). However, proofs are typically made up of
many steps, not all of which are necessarily developed with the same
rigour. So closer examination of proofs will represent them not as
single arguments but as structures of arguments (technically trees,
or directed acyclic graphs). Applying this detail to the broader pic-
ture suggested by Epstein requires the articulation of two parallel
A Mathematical Proof
Assumptions about how to reason and communicate.
argument















y
A Mathematical Inference
Premises





y
necessity
Conclusion
The mathematical inference is valid.
Figure 1. Epstein’s picture of mathematical proof [15]
structures: an inferential structure of formal derivations linking for-
mal statement to formal statement, and an argumentational struc-
ture of arguments by which mathematicians attempt to convince each
other of the soundness of the inferential structure, and thereby of
the acceptability of the informal counterparts of those statements.
In Hardy’s terms, it is the inferential structure which is responsible
for ‘exhibiting the pattern’ while the argumentational structure is re-
sponsible for ‘obtaining assent’. Fig. 2 summarizes this picture.
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Figure 2. The parallel structure of mathematical reasoning
This account both conserves and transcends the conventional view
of mathematical proof. The inferential structure is held to strict stan-
dards of rigour, without which the proof would not qualify as math-
ematical. However, the step-by-step compliance of the proof with
these standards is itself a matter of argument, and susceptible to chal-
lenge. Hence much actual mathematical practice takes place in the
argumentational structure. Careful demarcation of these two levels
is essential to the proper understanding of mathematics. If this ac-
count is correct, important concepts in the philosophy of mathemat-
ics, such as mathematical rigour and mathematical explanation, can
only properly be addressed when both of the parallel structures are
accounted for. In order to do so, we need to say more about the details
of the individual components of the two structures. The formal na-
ture of the inferential structure makes its characterization compara-
tively straightforward. It is a graph of vertices linked by edges, where
the vertices are statements expressed in some formal system and the
edges are derivations admissible in that system. The underlying for-
mal system might, for example, be a natural deduction presentation
of a particular system of logic, but more characteristically it will be a
higher-level language. The argumentational structure poses more of
a challenge, which I shall turn to in the next section.
2 The Argumentational Structure of Mathematics
Wilfred Hodges offers a brief analysis of ‘unformalised deductive
argument[s]’ that is of help here (although I shall argue that it is nec-
essary to generalize his account beyond deductive argumentation).
For Hodges, such arguments contain components of three sorts:
• There are the stated conclusion, the stated or implied start-
ing assumptions, and the intermediate propositions used in
getting from the assumptions to the conclusion. I shall call
these the object sentences.
• There are stated or implied justifications for putting the ob-
ject sentences in the places where they appear. For example
if the argument says ‘A, therefore B’, the arguer is claiming
that B follows from A.
• There are instructions to do certain things which are needed
for the proof. Thus ‘Suppose C’, ‘Draw the following pic-
ture, and consider the circles D and E’, ‘Define F as fol-
lows’. [21, 6]
The argumentational structure must account for all three of these
components.
The object sentences are the vertices of the argumentational struc-
ture. They are informal counterparts to formal statements of the in-
ferential structure. Strictly speaking, the inferential structure must be
grounded in axioms: propositions within the formal system whose
truth must be granted if the system is to be employed. (As such the
truth of the axioms cannot be established by formal proof; it is one
area of mathematics where informal argument is the only option.)
But practicing mathematicians seldom take things back that far. In-
stead, they begin as informal arguers do in any domain, with the in-
formal counterpart of formal axioms, endoxa: ‘propositions consid-
ered true by everybody, or by the majority, or by the wise’ [42, 273].
In mathematics, the endoxa comprise what Reuben Hersh has called
‘established mathematics’:
Established mathematics is the body of mathematics that is
accepted as the basis for mathematicians’ proofs. It includes
proved statements ‘in the literature,’ and also some simpler
statements that are so well accepted that no literature refer-
ence is expected. The central core of established mathematics
includes not only arithmetic, geometry, linear and polynomial
algebra, and calculus, but also the elements of function theory,
group theory, topology, measure theory, Banach and Hilbert
spaces, and differential equations—the usual first two years of
graduate study. And then to create new mathematics, one must
also master major segments of the established knowledge in
some special area [19].
Thus, since informal mathematics need not always start with first
principles, the argumentational structure will typically correspond
only to a proper substructure of its inferential counterpart.
However, the correspondence will not be vertex to vertex: for-
mal mathematics necessarily proceeds by very fine-grained incre-
ments, which the corresponding informal mathematical proofs typ-
ically elide. Thus many formal propositions of the inferential struc-
ture will have no counterpart object sentences in the argumentational
structure. Conversely, some object sentences will have no counterpart
formal propositions, since in some informal proofs there are object
sentences representing intermediate statements which are not strictly
needed for the validity of the proof, but only for its intelligibility [4].
As Hodges observes, the argumentational structure is more com-
plex than the inferential structure because it contains instructions
as well as justifications. The edges of the argumentational structure
must be defined loosely enough to articulate both components. Hersh
has the following to say about the linkages between object sentences:
Established mathematics is an intricately interconnected web
of mutually supporting concepts, which are connected both by
plausible and by deductive reasoning. . . . Deductive proof, mu-
tually supporting interconnections, and close interaction with
social life (commerce, technology, education) all serve to war-
rant the assertions of established mathematics. Deductive proof
is the principal and most important warrant [19].
Of course, this is still unformalized deductive proof, so it belongs in
the argumentational structure not the inferential structure. Nonethe-
less, in many cases, the formalization is fully worked out, or more
typically, it is clear how it could be. In this situation the correspond-
ing steps of the argumentational structure can be very simple; they
need do no more than point (as Hardy puts it) at the steps of the
inferential structure.1 But where the derivation is more complex or
contested, much more of the burden of the proof rests on the argu-
mentational structure. In those circumstances it becomes critical to
track and provide responses to the objections that may be raised to
the gaps in the inferential structure. As we shall see, exactly how
this is to be achieved turns on what steps are admissible in the ar-
gumentational structure. Moreover, Hersh observes what I suggested
above: even within established mathematics, not all the interconnec-
tions are deductive. Hence, some of the admissible steps will need to
be framed in more permissive terms.
Further progress requires closer attention to the individual steps of
the argumentational structure. One of the most influential attempts
to analyze argumentational steps without appealing to logical form
was developed in the 1950s by Stephen Toulmin. His ‘layout’ can
represent deductive inference, but encompasses many other species
of argument besides. In its simplest form, shown in Fig. 3(a), the
layout represents the derivation of a Claim (C), from Data (D), in
accordance with a Warrant (W ). This DWC pattern may appear to
resemble a deductive inference rule, such as modus ponens, but it
can be used to represent looser inferential steps.
The differences between the types of inference which the layout
may represent are made explicit by the additional elements of the
full layout shown in Fig. 3(b). The warrant is justified by its de-
pendence on Backing (B), possible exceptions or Rebuttals (R) are
allowed for, and the resultant force of the argument is stated in the
Qualifier (Q). Hence the full layout may be understood as ‘Given
that D, we can Q claim that C, sinceW (on account of B), unless R’.
1 Such ‘pointing’ may bring to mind Jody Azzouni’s ‘derivation indicator
view’ of mathematical practice [8]. However, Azzouni’s ‘indicating’ de-
scribes a looser correspondence, closer to that holding in general between
the two structures. Moreover, at least on some construals, such as that in
[14, 149], Azzouni’s conception of derivation is broader than mine, so this
is somewhat misleading.
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Figure 3. Toulmin layouts
In a frequently cited example (derived from [40, 104]), ‘Given that
HARRY WAS BORN IN BERMUDA, we can PRESUMABLY claim that
HE IS BRITISH, since ANYONE BORN IN BERMUDA WILL GENER-
ALLY BE BRITISH (on account of VARIOUS STATUTES . . . ), unless
HIS PARENTS WERE ALIENS, SAY.’ In recent years a number of au-
thors have demonstrated that informal deductive proofs may be rep-
resented using Toulmin layouts (for example [5, 23]). Elsewhere I
have shown how the layout may be generalized to exhibit arguments
of a greater degree of structural complexity [1, 213 ff.].
The Toulmin layout is well-adapted to display the object sentences
and justifications of specific steps of the argumentational structure.
However, instructions, the last of Hodges’s three argument compo-
nents would in general be difficult to fit into a Toulmin layout (al-
though it has been argued that the warrant should be understood as
an instruction not a proposition, [20, 71]). We also need a means to
characterize generic steps, if structures are to be analalyzed in terms
of the admissibility of steps. One way of tackling both issues is in
terms of argumentation schemes: stereotypical reasoning patterns,
often accompanied by critical questions, which itemize possible lines
of response. Schemes are framed in generic terms and there is no ob-
stacle to their inclusion of instructions as well as object sentences and
justifications (see [34, 49 f.] for an exploration of how this might be
done). Like the Toulmin layout, schemes can be deductive, although
they were devised to describe a more diverse range of arguments,
such as argument from consequences or argument from expert opin-
ion. (Chp. 9 of [42] catalogues sixty such schemes, many with mul-
tiple subvariants.) However, despite their topic-neutral provenance,
many of these schemes are applicable to mathematical argumentation
(as I have argued elsewhere: [2, 3]). Indeed, there is at least a family
resemblance between argumentation schemes and Toulmin layouts.
Most (instantiations of) schemes could be expressed as layouts: the
data and warrant correspond to premisses, the claim (suitably modi-
fied by the qualifier) to the conclusion, and the backing and rebuttal
both comprise possible answers to critical questions (for further dis-
cussion of the relationship of schemes to layouts, see [34, 28 ff.]).
We shall divide the schemes which will be needed to describe
mathematical reasoning into three groups, on the basis of how their
instantiations are related to the corresponding steps (if any) of the in-
ferential structure. A-schemes correspond directly to a derivation rule
of the inferential structure. (Equivalently, we could think in terms of
a single A-scheme, the ‘pointing scheme’ which picks out a deriva-
tion whose premisses and conclusion are formal counterparts of its
grounds and claim.) B-schemes are less directly tied to the inferential
structure. Their instantiations correspond to substructures of deriva-
tions rather than individual derivations (and they may appeal to ad-
ditional formally verified propositions). B-schemes may be thought
of as exclusively mathematical arguments: high-level algorithms or
macros that may in principle be formalized as multiple inferential
steps. C-schemes are even looser in their relationship to the inferen-
tial structure, since the link between their grounds and claim need
not be deductive. However, their instantiations may still correspond
to substructures of the inferential structure, although there will be no
guarantee that this is so and no procedure that will always yield the
required structure even when it exists.
I shall make three initial observations about the relationships be-
tween the three types of scheme. Firstly, the classification is rel-
ative to the composition of the inferential structure. For example,
if the inferential structure was a natural deduction presentation of
classical logic, then only schemes corresponding to the rules of that
system, such as modus ponens, would qualify as A-schemes; even
fairly elementary mathematical deductive inferences would comprise
B-schemes; and the C-schemes would cover inference patterns that
were not in general deductive. Alternatively, if the inferential struc-
ture was a higher-level but constructive system, such as Nuprl [28,
285], many of these B-schemes would be A-schemes since they cor-
responded to higher-level rules, but some of the A-schemes, the con-
structively inadmissible ones, would now be C-schemes. Secondly, in
terms of the Toulmin layout, the difference between the three types
of scheme is tracked by their qualifier. The A-schemes would all be
qualified as ‘by an immediate, formally valid derivation’, whereas the
B-schemes would all be qualified as ‘by an in-principle formalizable
valid deduction’. The C-schemes would have different qualifiers in
different cases: typically something like ‘by plausible mathematical
reasoning’, but sometimes weaker or stronger. This is a good reason
to explicitly state the qualifier, at least of C-schemes, as Matthew In-
glis has urged [23]. Thirdly, many schemes have subschemes: special
cases, all of whose instantiations might also be seen as instantiations
of the general scheme, but where additional constraints are imposed.
But the classification of a scheme as belonging to a specific type need
not transfer to its subschemes, which may well be more rigorous.
For instance, the example mentioned above of a scheme containing
instructions is a B-scheme, but also a subscheme of a C-scheme for
analogy [34, 49 f.].
3 Four Views of Mathematical Practice
Different views about which steps should be admitted to the infer-
ential structure give rise to different accounts of the foundations of
mathematics. Most conspicuously, the divergence between classical
and constructive mathematics may be characterized in these terms.
Correspondingly, different views about which steps should be admit-
ted to the argumentational structure give rise to different accounts
of mathematical practice. In this fashion, at least four such accounts
may be distinguished:
0. Only A-schemes are admissible. There is no such thing as ‘in-
formal mathematical reasoning’: only formalized reasoning can
count as mathematical. All that the argumentational structure can
do is ‘point’ at the inferential structure.
1. Only A- and B-schemes are admissible. Informal mathematical
reasoning is possible, but the argumentational structure must em-
ploy exclusively mathematical steps, albeit ones characterized in-
formally.
2. All three types of scheme are admissible. Informal mathematical
reasoning is possible, and the argumentational structure employs
both exclusively mathematical steps, and steps of more general
application.
3. Only topic-neutral A- or C-schemes are admissible. Informal
mathematical reasoning is possible, and must be understandable
purely in terms of steps of general application. No argumenta-
tional structure need contain any exclusively mathematical steps;
that is, all such steps must be reducible to instances of general
steps.
Support for each account may be found in mathematical practice.
This section explores their competing merits.
Option 0: No Such Thing as Informal Mathematics
The first question to ask about Option 0, the claim that all mathemat-
ics is formal, and hence that ‘informal mathematics’ is not mathemat-
ics, is whether it has ever been taken seriously. Both formalism and
logicism require that mathematics be formalizable, but neither the-
sis need insist that mathematics isn’t mathematics until it has been
formalized. This broader claim is more familiar as a polemical exag-
geration, as with Russell’s insistence that the history of (pure) math-
ematics began in 1854 [37, 75], or as a straw man erected by crit-
ics of such programmes. Hence Lakatos informs us that ‘according
to logical positivism, informal mathematics, being neither analytical
nor empirical, must be meaningless gibberish’ ([25, 59]). While this
may be a reasonable inference about the party line of a movement
now rather lacking in adherents, specific endorsements are harder
to find. For example, Carnap might seem a plausible candidate, but
closer inspection reveals this is not actually so [27, 14]. Looking be-
yond logical positivism, even the arch-formalists of Bourbaki do not
consistently practice what they preach, stressing instead the impor-
tance of ‘experience and mathematical flair’ [11, 8]. As the example
of Bourbaki demonstrates, whether or not this position is credible
as a regulative ideal, even its most single-minded proponents have
difficulty living up to it.
A more fundamental defence of Option 0 (or perhaps a narrow
interpretation of Option 1) arises from the wholesale rejection of in-
formal reasoning proposed by David Miller. He states that ‘It cannot
be denied that a complex sequence of interlocked blind guesses and
cruel rejections may look much like directed thought, just as Dar-
winian evolution simulates orthogenesis or design. But we must not
be hoodwinked into thinking that it is reasoning, or anything else that
we know, that drives us forward to what is unknown. What reason-
ing does is pull us back’ [32, 68]. For Miller, the only legitimate task
that arguments, deductive or otherwise, can perform is critical (and
only deductive arguments are any use for this) [33, 65]. He canvasses,
but rejects, three other possible roles: persuasion, discovery, and jus-
tification. Justification, he states, must entail regress or circularity,
because an argument can only justify if its premisses are themselves
justified. Persuasion he dismisses as unrelated to the argument: if
the argument is thought persuasive, it can only be because the pre-
misses are themselves persuasive, but then the argument makes no
contribution. His rejection of discovery as a property of argument is
more tendentious: he regards any discoveries arising from valid in-
ference as trivial, in so much as they would be already known to us,
were we logically omniscient. But this leads to two important con-
cessions: ‘To be sure, [deductive arguments] can provide new sub-
jective knowledge, in the way that mathematical proofs uncannily
do. Arguments, it may be conceded, do have an exploratory func-
tion, even if what they explore is what is already known, or conjec-
tured, about the world, and not the world itself’ [32, 66]. Already
known, that is, to the logically omniscient. Moreover, ‘inferences . . .
that resist deductive reconstruction,’ while ‘evidently indistinguish-
able from blind guesses, . . . can indeed lead to an augmentation of
knowledge (provided that knowledge is recognized, as it must be, to
be conjectural through and through and through)’ [32, 67]. So, if our
concern is with actual mathematical practice, in which logical omni-
science is sadly unavailable, then informal deductive arguments, and
even non-deductive arguments, can have a place in discovery.
In broader terms, we may observe that Miller’s challenge is most
effective against a position dual to his own: that argument only draws
us forward and never pulls us back. This would indeed be a danger-
ous position, especially if the steps of such arguments need not be de-
ductive. Even if individual steps carry high levels of confidence, pro-
viding that the doubts are independent and thereby cumulative, multi-
step arguments would swiftly grow less convincing as they lengthen.
A system which encouraged us to pursue such arguments without
correction could lead us far astray. But what of systems which per-
mit both the forward propagation of confidence and the back prop-
agation of doubt? Why must our guesses be blind? Certainly, prior
experience can be a poor guide and even the most confident hunches
can prove wide of the mark. But, if only for purposes of resource
management, they are often the best place to start.
Option 1: All Steps Exclusively Mathematical
B-schemes, the sort of schemes which are admissible at Option 1
but not at Option 0, comprise mathematical argument patterns of
more than purely local application. For example, diagonalization, or
finding the determinant of a matrix or the adjoint of an operator. In
more complicated cases, multiple B-schemes can act in concert as a
transferable technique which may be applied to diverse mathematical
problems. This is what Jody Azzouni calls an inference package:
a capacity to recognize the implications of several assumptions
by means of the representations of objects wherein those sev-
eral assumptions have been knit together (psychologically). I
also claim that the employment of inference packages shows up
everywhere in mathematical practice. What an inference pack-
age allows a mathematician to do is to reason about a subject
matter compatibly with a formal mechanical proof. His reason-
ing, however, is topic-specific and the various assumptions op-
erative in that reasoning function together in a way that makes
them phenomenologically invisible to him [9, 20].
B-schemes are in principle formalizable, that is to say any instantia-
tion of a given scheme in the argumentational structure should cor-
respond to a substructure of the inferential structure in a predictable
fashion. Nonetheless, actually working out what the latter structure
should be in a given case may be forbiddingly laborious. Many B-
schemes are intrinsic to established mathematics, and fluency in their
use is a prerequisite for participation in mathematical practice. (For
an attempt to construct an explicit B-scheme, see [34, 49 ff.].)
A lot of mathematics can be conducted using A- and B-schemes,
so Option 1 is a much more reasonable characterization of mathe-
matical practice than Option 0. However, as we shall see, it does have
important limitations. To stick at Option 1, and thereby reject the ad-
missibility of C-schemes, is to restrict mathematical practice to es-
tablished mathematical techniques. Hence, Option 1 comprises a de-
fence of the purity of proof method. This defence originates in Aris-
totle’s rejection of ‘metabasis’, or ‘kind crossing’, the use of meth-
ods proper to one domain of reasoning within another. Indeed, some
proponents of Option 1 appeal directly to Aristotle’s arguments (for
example, [24, 455 f.]). Thus, although geometrical methods would
be permitted in astronomy, which Aristotle regards as a science sub-
ordinate to geometry, they should not be used in arithmetic [6, 75a].
Hence mathematics are genuinely plural: for Aristotle, they comprise
several distinct domains whose methods overlap only by analogy [6,
76a]. In this respect he differs from Plato, for whom dialectic, that is
informal reasoning, comprises a highest domain to which all others
are subordinate [12, 179].
As an example of Aristotle’s approach, consider the following:
Bryson’s method of squaring the circle, even if the circle is
thereby squared, is still sophistical because it does not conform
to the subject in hand. So, then, any merely apparent reasoning
about these things is a contentious argument, and any reason-
ing that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand, even
though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument: for
it is merely apparent in its conformity to the subject matter, so
that it is deceptive and plays foul [7, 171b].
Some unpacking is required. Sources both ancient and modern dis-
agree as to precisely what Bryson’s method comprised ([30, 18, 47
ff.]; [16, 35]). But there is consensus that it began by both inscribing
and circumscribing the circle with squares, perhaps as in Fig. 4. One
school of thought, attributed to Proclus, represents Bryson’s argu-
ment as merely an existence claim: some square with an area between
the two must be equal in area to the circle. Another, questionably at-
tributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias, has Bryson proceed to inscribe
and circumscribe pentagons, then hexagons, and so on. With each
extra side the margin of error shrinks, so the method might charita-
bly be interpreted as a partial anticipation of the method Archimedes
used to estimate the area of a circle. However, in either case Aristo-
tle would reject the result as fallacious. This has the uncomfortable
corollary that, had he lived to see it, Aristotle would apparently have
rejected Archimedes’s method too.
Figure 4. Bryson’s method of squaring the circle
Of course, in one sense, Aristotle would be right: Archimedes’s
method is not purely geometrical, and however far it is taken it does
not constitute a solution to the ancient (and provably insoluble) prob-
lem of squaring the circle by a ruler and compass construction. The
difficulty with Aristotle’s approach is whether he can acknowledge
an innovative method as mathematical if it does not fit into any of
the kinds of mathematics which he recognizes. This is exacerbated
by his rejection of a common kind to which all other mathematical
kinds would be subordinate. Later purists have been less reticent:
Descartes proposed a mathesis universalis based on algebra; in the
twentieth century set theory and subsequently category theory have
been likewise proposed as common mathematical kinds. However,
such a relationship between a general system and specific mathemat-
ical inferences is easier to reconcile with formal than with informal
mathematics.
We may ask whether purity is an appropriate, or even intelligi-
ble ideal for informal mathematics. Methodological innovation often
originates in informal mathematics. When a new method is first pro-
posed, it can be controversial whether it qualifies as mathematical.
Typically, its early use is restricted to the heuristic pursuit of results
subsequently confirmed by more conventional means. Euler’s em-
ployment of alternating series to establish that ∑∞n=1 1/n
2
= pi
2/6
is one frequently discussed example [35]; the anticipation of the
Laplace transform by Heaviside’s operator methods another [22]. To
insist on purity of method at this point may be appropriate if the in-
formally derived results are (mis)represented as formally sound, but
can otherwise only be an unnecessary brake on progress.
In conclusion, Aristotle may charitably be read as talking only of
(mutatis mutandis) formal mathematics, and therefore not endorsing
Option 1 after all. Latterday Aristoteleans, in so far as they insist on
‘certain conventions to which an argument must conform to be an
argument within the discipline’ [24, 455 f.], beg the question against
methodological innovation. Requiring that the new method be shown
to be mathematical before it can be admitted into informal mathemat-
ical reasoning is to require that it be shown to be either formally valid
or heuristically useful. But the former is inappropriate for informal
mathematics and the latter can only be demonstrated through exten-
sive use.
Option 2: Not All Steps Exclusively Mathematical
The Victorian mathematician J. J. Sylvester, in defending his disci-
pline from the ill-informed criticism of T. H. Huxley, stressed ‘how
much observation, divination, induction, experimental trial, and ver-
ification, causation, too (if that means, as I suppose it must, mount-
ing from phenomena to their reasons or causes of being2) have to do
with the work of the mathematician’ [39, 1762]. This perspective em-
phasizes the connexions between mathematical practice and ordinary
reasoning, much of it comprising C-schemes, thereby leading to Op-
tion 2 or, when the ordinary reasoning is understood as underpinning
the mathematical practice, Option 3.
One important challenge to Option 2 arises from an ambiguity be-
tween two senses of the phrase ‘mathematical argument’. The am-
biguity may be resolved by applying the terminology of Toulmin
layouts. When ‘mathematical argument’ occurs in ordinary, that is
non-mathematical, discourse it often serves to indicate that the ar-
gument has a mathematical warrant and/or backing, and thereby a
mathematical qualifier. For example, in a discussion on the prospects
of two competing political candidates it might be argued that one
candidate is too far behind to win, even if all the uncounted ballots
had been cast in his favour. The proponent of such an argument may
stress that it was a ‘purely mathematical argument’, thereby empha-
sizing its difference from typical political arguments: a more robust
2 This would seem to be an attempt to characterize what would later be de-
scribed as abductive reasoning, or inference to the best explanation.
warrant and qualifier. If that were the only context in which ‘mathe-
matical argument’ were used it would appear that the mathematical
nature of the warrant (or qualifier) was essential, thereby ruling out
topic-neutral schemes, and thereby Option 2. But this would be to ig-
nore the non-mathematical context—the warrant is singled out since
it is what makes the argument different from other arguments to the
same claim. In broader terms, we might also classify this as a politi-
cal argument, since it derives a political claim from political data. In
this second sense, a mathematical argument will be one which arises
in mathematical discourse. Characteristically, this will entail the data
and claim being mathematical, but not necessarily that the warrant
should be so too.
If warrants in mathematical arguments are not mathematical what
are they? The positive argument in defence of the mathematical use
of C-schemes can best be made by answering this question. As dis-
cussed in Sect 2, although argumentation schemes have been devel-
oped primarily for non-mathematical contexts, many of them lend
themselves readily to mathematical application. For example, con-
sider the following scheme for argument from analogy:
ARGUMENTATION SCHEME FOR ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY
Similarity Premise Generally, caseC1 is similar to caseC2.
Base Premise A is true (false) in caseC1.
Conclusion A is true (false) in caseC2.
Critical Questions:
CQ1. Are there differences betweenC1 andC2 that would tend
to undermine the force of the similarity cited?
CQ2. Is A true (false) inC1?
CQ3. Is there some other caseC3 that is also similar toC1, but
in which A is false (true)? [42, 315]
This is a C-scheme because it is topic-neutral and not necessarily de-
ductive. Whether or not this scheme is deductively valid turns on the
interpretation of the warrant, that is the similarity premise. If ‘sim-
ilar’ is defined narrowly enough, providing an equivalence between
ostensibly unrelated mathematical structures, the premise would be
categorical, and the scheme valid. This can be a source of formidable
insight. The graph theorist Bill Tutte gives an impressive example
in describing how he and three colleagues came to falsify Lusin’s
Conjecture, that no square can be dissected into smaller squares,
all of different sizes: ‘Eventually we found that a squared rectangle
was equivalent to an electrical network of unit resistances. . . . We
now understood that the basic theory of squared rectangles was that
of Kirchoff’s Laws of electrical networks. That was something we
could look up in textbooks’ [41, 3 ff.]. The similarity premiss is the
equivalence that Tutte and his colleagues found, which could be for-
mally demonstrated. Hence the base premisses, which they looked
up in textbooks, were known to have true analogues in the theory of
squared rectangles. This suggests that this specific case of analogy
may also instantiate some B-scheme which is a subscheme of the
general C-scheme for analogy above. One such subscheme is dis-
cussed in [34, 49 f.], but a better fit may be found in the account of
analogy in [10], which may be construed as the articulation of several
such subschemes.
But even if the similarity premise is defeasible, the scheme char-
acterizes a versatile pattern-spotting procedure which can be an in-
valuable source of mathematical hypotheses. (This is not to prejudge
the question whether defeasible analogies are only useful as heuris-
tics.) A familiar example is the extension of the number concept,
from natural numbers to rational numbers, irrational numbers, nega-
tive numbers, imaginary numbers, transfinite numbers, and so forth.
Each of these steps proceeded by analogy, and was initially contro-
versial. These moves also gave rise to further analogies, as properties
known to apply to one sort of number were conjectured to apply to
other sorts. For example, Wallis conjectured that np × nq = np+q,
known to apply for integer p, q, also held when the indices were
fractional or negative [38, 158].
Informal analogies can be drawn from areas outside mathematics.
For example, the optimization technique of ‘simulated annealing’ is
motivated by an analogy with the metallurgical technique of anneal-
ing [31, 120]. The mathematical problem is that many search proce-
dures designed to find the global maximum of functions of multiple
independent variables will halt at local optima, that is globally subop-
timal solutions. The analogous problem in metallurgy is that metals
(and other crystalline substances) if cooled too quickly from a molten
state will ‘freeze in’ irregularities, producing a structure of higher en-
ergy level, and typically weaker structural integrity. The solution is
gradual cooling, which finds an analogy in the incremental reduction
of a control parameter in the simulated annealing algorithm. Here,
the base premiss, that is the data, is drawn frommetallurgy, not math-
ematics, while the warrant asserts the analogy between the two fields,
and is thus not wholly mathematical either. Nonetheless, the claim is
a substantial contribution to a mathematical problem. While more
formal arguments have been made for the effectiveness of simulated
annealing, as they must be if it is to have a permanent place in math-
ematics, this analogy is independently compelling, and was crucial
to its discovery.
We have seen that the data, the warrant, and thereby the quali-
fier of a mathematical argument may be non-mathematical. How-
ever, arguments with non-mathematical claims would ipso facto not
be contributions to mathematics, but rather mathematical contribu-
tions to whatever discourse the claim was drawn from. What of the
other components of the Toulmin layout? The susceptibility of math-
ematical argument to what Lakatos describes as ‘heuristic falsifiers’
would suggest the admissibility of non-mathematical rebuttals [26,
36]. (If a heuristic falsifier succeeds, the inferential structure is unaf-
fected, since it is still formally valid, but the argumentational struc-
ture would be forced to follow a different path, bypassing the ‘falsi-
fied’ content.) And even ostensibly mathematical warrants may have
non-mathematical backing, as the next section demonstrates.
Option 3: No Steps Exclusively Mathematical
The distinction between Option 2 and Option 3 turns on whether
all the instantiations of mathematical schemes in the argumenta-
tional structure are reducible to instantiations of non-mathematical
schemes, or more precisely, whether all instantiations of B-schemes
are decomposable into sequences or combinations of instantiations
of A- and C-schemes. Advocates of Option 2 hold that room must
be left for the irreducibly mathematical, even in the argumentational
structure; proponents of Option 3 disagree.
This dispute may be difficult to resolve. On the one hand, there
are elementary topic-neutral A- and C-schemes in mathematics, and
many instantiations of more complex B-schemes can be reduced to
instantiations of such schemes in an obvious enough if tedious fash-
ion. Such, after all, is one of the goals of proof. On the other hand,
there are many B-schemes of formidable complexity, for example
those invoking widely used but hard to prove results. Even if B-
schemes of this character can be understood as ultimately depending
on elementary, topic-neutral A- or C-schemes, such schemes would
seem so remote from the use to which the B-scheme was put, espe-
cially in informal contexts, as to be of no practical relevance. But no-
tice that this ostensible counterexample to Option 3 makes a crucial
concession: if the arguer is merely using the result, and not reestab-
lishing it on the fly, then the backing for his argument is not wholly
mathematical. Rather he is ultimately relying, quite properly, on an
argument from expert opinion. If the argument is challenged, the ar-
guer will typically make the backing more explicit to show how the
contentious scheme is supported, thereby answering one of its critical
questions. This may take the form of restating the argument in more
elementary steps, thereby bringing it closer to topic-neutral schemes,
or the arguer may be forced to acknowledge that he is using a result
which he is unable to prove, at least on demand, but has on good au-
thority, at which point he has clearly resorted to a non-mathematical
scheme.
More direct motivation for Option 3 may be found in the widely
held thesis that ‘there are certain basic forms of thought and argu-
ment which are prior to the development of formal Mathematics’
[36, 237]. Such intuitions have taken a variety of forms. For example,
Jody Azzouni once developed (but subsequently repudiated) a view
of informal mathematics as a subdoxastic process analogous to that
governing grammar, from which he infers that ‘all reasoning is topic-
neutral in nature’ [9, 18 f.]. Keith Devlin reaches a similar conclu-
sion from the grounds that mathematical ‘thought processes are com-
prised of brain activation patterns that are associated with real world
stimuli’ [13, 378]. Penelope Maddy proposes basing mathematics on
‘a characterization of classical logic as grounded in a rudimentary
logic that’s both true of the world and embedded in our most primi-
tive modes of cognition’ [29, 288]. As Ian Dove concludes, ‘mathe-
matical reasoning is already in accord with principles and techniques
from informal logic—even if this is unnoticed by the practitioners’
[14, 150].
We have seen that all four options have defenders amongst both
mathematicians and philosophers. However, Option 0 relies on ei-
ther an untenable idealization of mathematical practice, or an arbi-
trary restriction of ‘mathematics’ to exclude much of that practice.
And Option 1 is hard to reconcile with methodological innovation.
That leaves Option 2 and Option 3, both of which leave room for
informal reasoning in mathematical practice. Resolving the debate
between these positions turns on whether all inferences of informal
mathematics may be reduced to combinations of topic-neutral infer-
ences. A final answer to this question is beyond the scope of this
paper, but I would suggest that the onus is on proponents of Option 2
to provide examples of informal mathematical inferences for which
no such reduction is possible.
4 Conclusion
This paper has defended an account of mathematical reasoning as
comprised of two parallel structures. The argumentational structure
is composed of arguments by means of which mathematicians seek
to persuade each other of their results. The inferential structure is
composed of derivations which offer a formal counterpart to these
arguments. The precise relationship between the two structures may
be understood in terms of the range of argumentation schemes which
may be instantiated by steps of the argumentational structure. Just
as different views about the foundations of mathematics may be
characterized in terms of the admissibility of steps in the inferen-
tial structure, different views about mathematical practice may be
characterized in terms of the admissibility of steps in the argumenta-
tional structure. I have made the case that a wide range of schemes
should be admitted to the argumentational structure. Two distinct ar-
eas emerge for further exploration: firstly, the investigation of fine-
tuned, specifically mathematical B-schemes; and secondly, the appli-
cation to mathematics of topic-neutral C-schemes.
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Formal Representation and Proof for Cooperative Games
Manfred Kerber and Christoph Lange and Colin Rowat1
Abstract. In this contribution we present some work we have been
doing in representing and proving theorems from the area of eco-
nomics, and mainly we present work we will do in a project in which
we will apply mechanised theorem proving tools to a class of eco-
nomic problems for which very few general tools currently exist. For
mechanised theorem proving, the research introduces the field to a
new application domain with a large user base; more specifically,
the researchers are collaborating with developers working on state-
of-the-art theorem provers. For economics, the research will provide
tools for handling a hard class of problems; more generally, as the
first application of mechanised theorem proving to centrally involve
economic theorists, it aims to properly introduce mechanised theo-
rem proving techniques to the discipline.
1 Introduction
Finding stable sets [in cooperative games] involves a new tour
de force of mathematical reasoning for each game or class of
games that is considered. Other than a small number of ele-
mentary truisms . . . there is no theory, no tools, certainly no
algorithms. R. Aumann (Economics Nobel laureate of 2005),
1987 [1].
While proving mathematical theorems is often seen as a rigorous
process from the outside, it remains, as a form of human reason-
ing, an error-prone process (e.g. through the omission of hidden as-
sumptions). It is also costly. A system must first be formalised by
selection of an axiom set. An appropriate solution concept must then
be posited. Third, its properties must be derived, typically existence
of the solution, uniqueness, and perhaps smoothness. Finally, if the
solution does not behave as expected, the axioms may be adjusted,
and the process be restarted. The third step, and its repetitions, is
typically the most expensive, and certainly error-prone. This is par-
ticularly true when working with new axiomatic systems for which
researchers have only limited intuitions.
Lakatos’ classic study of this process used Euler’s polyhedron for-
mula [20], but examples can be found in any discipline. In coopera-
tive game theory – the application domain of the research presented
here – even the most respected researchers illustrate it. For instance,
in [24], which laid the foundations of modern game theory, von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern assumed that their solution concept, the sta-
ble set, always existed in the most widely studied class of cooperative
games; this assumption was later shown false [21]. More recently,
Nobel laureate Maskin [22] claimed in a presidential address to the
Econometric Society, economics’ leading society for economic the-
ory, that certain properties of a game generalised beyond n = 3;
counterexamples to this claim were found [7].
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Errors and confusion are undesirable for purely intellectual rea-
sons. Further, when the results claimed may come to inform public
policy, as can happen with applications of economic theory to the
financial world, additional concerns arise and the consequences can
be severe. For both of these reasons it is desirable to make use of
the recent progress both in mechanised theorem proving and in for-
mally supporting human researchers. Mechanised theorem proving
systems have reached a level which allows their application to previ-
ously intractable areas; proof development environments are success-
fully used in areas as diverse as hardware verification [12], software
verification (in particular in safety relevant areas [27]), mathemati-
cal proof development (e.g., the advanced research mathematics in
Hales’ Flyspeck project [11]), and educational systems [23]. All se-
curity sensitive software must satisfy high standards of formal veri-
fication (Evaluation Assurance Level 7, the highest standard [6]) to
be approved by national agencies or accredited evaluation facilities.
In addition to providing valuable services to new application areas,
these developments have also led to insights into the strengths and
weaknesses of the systems themselves.
In addition to reducing the possibility of error or confusion, formal
methods also enable the reuse of proof tactics and offer the eventual
promise of making the process of theory development and testing
faster and less costly.
2 Degrees of formalisation
This research uses different types of mathematical knowledge repre-
sentation and theorem proving tools.
Semi-formal representation systems The mathematical knowl-
edge incorporated in mathematical theorems is typically given in
the form of a PDF document, or a LATEX source document. Formal
representation systems such as sTEX [19], a semantic extension for
LATEX make it possible to not only generate high-quality PDF out-
put, but also to disambiguate mathematical text and thus make it ac-
cessible to further semantic services, which become available after
translation to the more machine-friendly XML-based OMDoc for-
mat [18]: semantic content search as well as soft checks of the sound-
ness of mathematical work. Such services demonstrate their full po-
tential when they are applied to a whole collection of mathemati-
cal documents published on the Web (possibly even interlinked with
external, related collections); semantic publication formats such as
HTML 5 allow readers to interact with these services from within
documents published in a human-readable way [8]. A system like
sTEX can therefore be the starting point of semi-formal services;
sTEX and OMDoc have been successfully applied to the represen-
tation of mathematics, software engineering [17], physics [13] and
other mathematics related fields. Economics will be an exciting new
application area.
Theorem provers Theorem provers allow mathematical theorems
to be formally proved, either fully automatically (q.v. systems such
as Theorema or Leo), or interactively by allowing the user to develop
a machine checked proof (q.v. Isabelle). Systems differ in a number
of ways, including whether they use first order or higher order logic,
types or not. This has consequences on the difficulty of beginning
to work with them. In Theorema, an untyped system, an initial for-
malisation can be done relatively painlessly for users familiar with
the Mathematica computer algebra system, in which Theorema is
implemented and whose representation philosophy it follows. In Is-
abelle and Leo, both typed systems, this initial step is much harder;
however, some mistakes, inaccuracies, and inconsistencies are dis-
covered by the type system. Proving theorems is, however, generally
difficult and, except for relatively easy theorems, usually requires at
least some interactivity (for automated theorem provers the interac-
tion means typically the adjustment of search options, reformulations
of the problem, and the introduction of lemmas).
The usage of new theorem proving tools poses problems even for
users with experience in the field. Some typical examples of such
problems are:
• How to exactly formulate a particular concept and to be consistent
with the formulation.
• To know whether the formulation chosen is adequate and the
prover should be able to prove the theorems in this form or not.
• Which system to use for a particular problem.
Ideally there would exist a rulebook or cookbook when to use
which system and how to apply it. While there are certain rules of
thumb on when and how to apply systems – such as for a first or-
der problem use a first order theorem prover and not a higher order
one, likewise for a propositional logic problem a SAT solver – they
are not strong enough to guide inexperienced users. A rule of thumb
should also not be taken too seriously, since the same problem (e.g.,
Arrow’s theorem), may be formulated and proved in different logics.
Systems may solve problems which are very hard for humans since
they can search big search spaces very efficiently, but may not solve
other problems with which humans have almost no problems. The
latter may be the case since humans are often guided by an intuition
– based on experience, examples, counterexamples – which is typi-
cally hard to add to an automated system. As a consequence humans
often have to give a lot of detailed information about a proof, which
would be left implicit on paper, in order to make it formal.
It should be noted that even if statements are not fully proved for-
mally a formalisation can result in a much higher degree of accuracy.
As soon as you start working with a formalisation – e.g., by stat-
ing some simple consequences – you may detect some unwarranted
consequences which should lead to an improved formalisation.
The problems generated in our research will form a new class of
challenge problems for automated theorem provers. The theorems in
our application domain are typically formulated in higher order logic,
but it is not clear whether all (or which ones) are inherently higher
order. Correspondingly it will be investigated how many and which
theorems can be proved automatically by first order theorem provers
such as Vampire, or whether a higher order theorem prover such as
Leo [2] can better deal with them. It will also be interesting to see
how these systems compare with Theorema as an untyped system.
Theorema has the additional advantage to allow for mixing reason-
ing and computation. The problem formalisations will be exported
to the TPTP archive [28] as a new class of challenge problems for
automated theorem provers.
3 Mechanised reasoning within economics
Modern economics has been transformed by a range of reasoning
support tools, including computer algebra systems (e.g. Maple and
Mathematica), statistical packages (e.g. STATA and R) and game
solvers (e.g. Gambit). However, the advances in formalised mathe-
matics and mechanised reasoning have yet to have had a discernible
impact on economics. Mathematical knowledge representation and
mechanised reasoning has been applied to known results in eco-
nomics: results in social choice have attracted the most attention,
including studies by Wiedijk [30] using Mizar, Nipkow [25] using
HOL, and Grandi and Endriss [10] using Prover9. Non-cooperative
game theory has also received some attention, including by Vester-
gaard [29] (with Coq). None of this research has involved economic
theorists, nor has it been published in economics journals, giving it
a marginal effect on economics to date. Thus, given the clear im-
portance of these techniques, leading economic theorists have main-
tained a ‘watching brief’, aware that they will eventually be adopted
by the discipline, but unsure as to when or how.
4 Cooperative game theory
Game theory models agents’ strategic interactions. The more famil-
iar branch of the field is non-cooperative game theory, which defines
a game form (a set of permissible moves) and then seeks a Nash equi-
librium (a strategy for each agent such that none can do better by uni-
laterally selecting a different strategy). Cooperative game theory, on
the other hand, abstracts from specific details of play, instead defin-
ing an irreflexive binary relation, called dominance, directly on the
set of outcomes. In complex social environments, cooperative game
theory may yield more robust insights than those tied to a particular
game form.
Solutions to cooperative games are sets of outcomes satisfying
conditions on dominance, principally the core (the set of undomi-
nated allocations) and a stable set (a set in which no element domi-
nates another element in the set, but each other element in the whole
space is dominated by an element in the stable set), von Neumann
and Morgenstern’s original solution concept. While the core is a
computationally simple structure, requiring no worse than pairwise
tests of the dominance relation, the stable set is not. Even in certain
simple games, the question of whether an outcome belongs to a stable
set is NP-complete [4]; more generally, Deng and Papadimitriou [9]
have argued that the question of whether a stable set even exists can
be undecidable.
We work with pillage games, a class of cooperative games intro-
duced by Jordan [14] and studied by us since 2007. Pillage games are
defined by imposing monotonicity on the dominance relation to cap-
ture two basic intuitions: coalitions gain power as they gain members,
and as their members gain resources. Technically, this monotonicity
allows the dominance relation to be represented by a power function.
Practically, pillage games help model contests of power – quintessen-
tially complex social situations (e.g. political parties’ redistribution
of resources to benefit their supporters). To our knowledge, our work
represents the first attempt to formally prove properties of a cooper-
ative game.
Pillage games are well-suited for our purposes for a number of
reasons. First, we know that they are tractable. Second, as they have
only been introduced recently, it is possible to formally represent ev-
erything known about pillage games in a reasonable amount of time.
Third, they form a richer class of games than the two most commonly
studied classes of cooperative games. Fourth, the formal similarities
between cooperative games and graphs (q.v. [3]) may allow rapid ap-
plication of results to network economics, operations research, and
combinatorial optimisation (including matching problems).
5 Work Plan
We will formally represent pillage games, and formally prove their
key properties. A semi-formal representation will be done in sTEX.
This is relatively inexpensive and allows efficient search for prop-
erties (such as the respective dependencies of definitions, lemmas,
and theorems), aiding the reuse of results in the development of new
theories.
Formal proofs will be generated using Theorema and Isabelle, and
possibly a third system (likely from Wiedijk’s list at [31]), allow-
ing comparison of the systems. This will result in great reliability of
the theorems proved. As the theorems are typically of a higher or-
der logic type, we will generate challenge problems for higher order
theorem provers and integrate them into the TPTP problem library,
fully automated theorem provers such as Leo will be tested on these
problems. Proof tactics will be generated to simplify the generation
of formal proofs.
Using the formalisation developed, new results on pillage games
will be sought by relaxing some of the additional axioms imposed on
top of pillage games’ basic monotonicity axioms. We shall primarily
aim to remove the symmetry axiom. By allowing consideration of
non-identical agents, this would ease attempts to empirically falsify
theoretical predictions. Efforts at falsification are particularly useful
in cooperative game theory, which has almost no associated empir-
ical or experimental literature. Newly developed knowledge will be
formally represented and investigated to ascertain which proof tactics
used can be re-used (or adjusted).
Mechanised theorem proving may also provide important
metaphors for economic research into bounded rationality, which has
tended to use the number of cells in a finite automaton as its complex-
ity measure. Mechanised theorem proving offers other measures, in-
cluding search depth, tree-span, and perhaps most interestingly, the
low-cost encoding of repeatedly used strategies as tactics.
Mechanised theorem proving as a field will benefit from a new
and challenging application domain with a large user base. Testing
theorem provers on a class of problems for which they have not been
designed may highlight shortcomings, and suggest developments in
theorem proving. The experience gathered in this project will directly
feed in the reimplementation of the Theorema system.
For economic theory, the research will provide a proof of concept,
providing tools and algorithms for handling a famously hard class
of problems. It will provide a focal point for putting proofs in the-
oretical economics to a new level of reliability. This will lead to an
improved reliability of the results in a field which studies complex
social systems on which we all rely.
6 Illustrative example
To illustrate what is proposed, consider the first lemma from [15].
Lemma 1 Any power function pi (C,x) can be represented by
another, pi′
(
C, (xi)i∈C
)
, which depends only on the resource
holdings of its coalition members.
We have formalised and proved this lemma (and some others) in
the Isabelle theorem proving system [26] as well as in the Theorema
system [5], see [16].
The Theorema formalisation is:
Lemma[“powerfunction-independent”, any[pi, n, C, x, y],
with[allocationn[x] ∧ allocationn[y] ∧ C ⊆ I[n] ∧
powerfunction[pi, n]],
∀
i∈C
(xi = yi) =⇒ (pi[C, x] = pi[C, y]) ]
The proof uses the weak resource monotonicity axiom of pillage
games, WR: “if yi ≥ xi∀i ∈ C ⊆ I then pi (C,y) ≥ pi (C,x))” and
basic properties of real numbers, in particular, the law of trichotomy
that for any two real numbers a and b holds one of the three cases
a < b, a = b, or a > b.
Proof: Consider arbitrary x,y such that xi = yi ∀i ∈ C ⊆
I . Then yi ≥ xi and xi ≥ yi so that axiom WR requires
pi (C,y) ≥ pi (C,x) ≥ pi (C,y). For this to hold, pi (C,x)
cannot depend on xj for any j /∈ C.
The concepts involved in the lemma are mathematically relatively
simple and easy to prove (others are considerably more difficult).
However, a logical formulation can be more complex than expected
and several design decisions have to be taken. Considerable efforts
will be put in the question on how to facilitate an easy start for users
of systems such as Isabelle and Theorema, who are not experts in
theorem proving. The initial hurdle for the typed system of Isabelle
is higher than that for the untyped Theorema system. However, it is
much easier to get things wrong in an untyped system. Concretely,
the first concept – that of a power function – was the most difficult
one, since it was necessary to represent a function with range of a
subset of agents and an n-tuple of real numbers adding up to one.
Once this concept was represented other concepts were relatively
standard to represent.
7 Conclusion
We have started to formalise a (small) area of theoretical economics
in different ways and to different degrees in order to be able to study
the benefit that can be obtained from these formalisations. We are at
the start of the project and would like to get feedback from the par-
ticipants of the symposium also to direct us to promising approaches
and to learn about related work.
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Mathematical Notation and Analogy
Alan Smaill1
Abstract. The choice of mathematical symbols, such as connec-
tives, while being arbitrary from a logic point of view, is nevertheless
important for intuitive understanding, especially in new and unfamil-
iar theories. The case of Linear Logic, where there are two distinctly
different proposals for the choice of connectives, shows the influence
of different mathematical analogies at work.
1 Analogy via Infomorphism
One way to treat analogy in mathematics is via some notion of
structure-preserving morphism from syntactic representations to syn-
tactic representations (or structures to structures, or both). A recent
example of this sort of approach is [4].
One way to look for this in action is to look at the choice of sym-
bols (rather than in the axiomatisation directly, for example) when
a new mathematical theory or domain is being developed. Here the
mathematician is free to introduce not only natural language-like ter-
minology, but also to introduce new mathematical or logical sym-
bols, which are often notational variants on existing symbols, chosen
to convey a close relationship with some existing symbol. For exam-
ple, the integral sign
R
started out as a version of the letter “S”, for
sum; the choice of the Greek “Σ” for summation of series has the
same motivation. This suggests that the relation of visual similarity
between symbols gives a hint to an analogy between the new do-
main, for which the symbol is introduced, and some well-established
domain, in which the original symbol already plays a role.
Our intention is to use the machinery described above to elucidate
this sort of situation; the case of linear logic provides us with some
useful information.
An interesting aspect here is that we see a blurring of the line be-
tween what is usually thought of as variation in surface presentation
(eg different fonts as in Σ, Σ; and different symbols as in→,().
2 Case Study: Linear Logic
Girard in 1987 introduced a new logic called Linear Logic that deals
with propositions as resources, which can be used up or created. For
the standard propositional connectives (and, or, implies), the new
system has two new connectives, known as the additive and multi-
plicative versions of the connective. Girard’s notation is given in [2].
Subsequently Troelstra’s exposition of Linear Logic [7] uses dif-
ferent notation for some of the symbols, keeping others, and even
swapping a couple of Girard’s symbols around. Troelstra explain his
motivation for preferring different symbols, and gives his account of
Girard’s own motivation.
The choice of propositional connectives is given in table 1.
1 Edinburgh University, Scotland, email: A.Smaill@ed.ac.uk
symbol Girard Troelstra
negation ⊥ ∼
mult conjunction ⊗ ?
mult disjunction ℘ +
mult one 1 1
mult zero ⊥ 0
additive conjunction & u
additive disjunction ⊕ unionsq
additive one > >
additive zero 0 ⊥
linear implication ( (
Table 1. Comparison of connectives
We see that in this set of connectives only three are in common
( ,1,>); Troelstra has different symbols for five, and confusingly
the symbols⊥,0 are swapped around between the two presentations.
Because the two presentations are of the same logic, simply us-
ing different symbols, in formal terms the axiomatisations are very
nearly identical; in terms of signature morphisms they are isomor-
phic, which is to say that they are notational variants [5]. But, in
this unfamiliar setting, having symbols that carry certain expecta-
tions from previous experience can have a large influence on how
easy it is to understand the system. (Personally, I find Troesltra’s pre-
sentation easier to remember, despite having seen and worked with
Girard’s first.)
We can consider the two presentations above as involving design
choices abut which symbols to use — to reuse symbols with estab-
lished, and indeed multiple uses, or invent new symbols which are
nevertheless reminiscent of familiar symbols, as in the cases of the
implication (the “lolli”: (), or even carrying few suggestions (the
“par”: ℘). [3] discusses such design choices in the context of his so-
called semiotic morphisms, a variant on the morphisms mentioned
above.
Design is the problem of massaging a source space, a target
space and a morphism to achieve suitable quality, subject to
constraints. The extent to which structure is actually preserved
gives a way to compare the quality of semiotic morphisms . . .
Goguen in [6]
The “preservation of structure” alluded to here corresponds to the
possibilities for analogical transfer, such as familiar properties asso-
ciated with a given symbol, or indeed a given similar symbol. The
possibility of such analogical transfer is of course one of the distinc-
tive features of analogical reasoning in general. [1].
Consider using the correlation between symbols (the visual sim-
ilarity) as indicative of a systematic relationship between two sign
systems. Thus an analogy where symbols are mapped to similar sym-
bols may support analogical transfer of the appropriate relationships
more easily than would be the case if dissimilar symbols were in-
volved. This is related to Goguen’s criteria for goodness of semiotic
morphisms in [6, sec 4], if we allow a weaker notion of preservation
of constructors.
2.1 Troelstra’s choice
Troelstra in [7, pp 21–22] explains his choice of connectives, which
emaphasise symmetries seen in many logics, based on the de Morgan
duality bytween classical logical disjunction and conjunction, eg the
equivalence of ¬(P ∧ Q) with ¬P ∨ ¬Q; he thus has these laws
holding for the pairs unionsq,u and +, ?. These depend on the pairs of
symbols being associated together in previous situations. The choice
of unionsq,u,>,⊥ is motivated by the fact that under a natural choice of
order on formulae (when on logically entails the other), these in fact
obey the axioms for lattices.
2.2 Girard’s choice
Girard’s choice also invokes previously understood situations, in this
case tensor algebra, where⊗ is used for example for the tensor prod-
uct of modules; ⊕ is used there for the direct sum, and the distribu-
tivity law from that situation holds here:
A⊗ (B ⊕ C) is equivalent to (A⊗B)⊕ (A⊗ C)
From other situations, it is natural here to associate 1,0 with the
identity elements associated with ⊗,⊕ respectively (eg 1 ⊗ A is
equivalent to A).
3 Conclusion
A view on the relationship between different axiomatisations that
takes into account similarity of symbols enables us to see the math-
ematical analogies that are in play more or less easily. There is a
cognitive claim here, which would surely be hard to substantiate,
suggesting that in situations where a particular analogical transfer
would be useful, the notation that emphasises that particular anal-
ogy would result in easier understanding, or faster problem-solving.
There is an opportunity here to look at the application of Cognitive
Modelling techniques to some version of this problem.
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 Discovery in Mathematics as an Experiential 
Practice of Privation 
 
Sandra Visokolskis1  
 
ABSTRACT.   The purpose of this paper is to 
clarify certain issues concerning the notion of 
creative discovery in mathematics. This is done so by 
presenting an integrative model of the creative 
process based on cyclical stages, which give an 
account of the sudden emergence of mathematical 
results in a disruptive, rather than in a non automatic 
nor mechanical, manner.    
     This leads to the characterization of the discovery 
in mathematics as an active and experiential process. 
When such process results in a creative act of a not 
completely deductive origin, it is obtained due to an 
instance of privation, i.e. what Aristotle had 
interpreted in terms of an attribute that a subject 
could have whether it is yet in its possession or not. 
Instead, what happens at discovery process occurs 
through an unexpected twist, namely, that such 
privation anticipates a breach in the standard 
reasoning, thus allowing room for creativity. 
Therefore, in cases of not fully deductive derivation, 
discovery is dialectic of privation and creation. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Discovery in mathematics may be interpreted to 
appear in two different ways at least. It seems that a 
mathematician reaches an innovative result either by 
means of a process of sustained reasoning -
continuism- , or, due to difficulties that block the 
normal course of the rational process, in which case 
the hard work is stopped, and begins breaking away 
from the task, -intentionally or not-, appearing some 
time later a solution, with the illusion of being 
fortuitous -disruptivism-.  
     This paper attempts to characterize the creative 
discovery in mathematics, in a disruptive manner, i.e. 
the second alternative, where the rational break that 
occurs on the way to solve the problem is generally 
due to an aporetic situation, i.e.,  an apparent dead-
end is reached, moment which creativity’s theorists 
baptize as "incubation period" [32]. We seek to 
characterize the incubation as a privation, i.e., a 
notion that Aristotle described in terms of an attribute 
that a subject could have, even though it is not in its 
possession yet, which is not merely an absence but a 
potentiality that can be changed into being that actual 
attribute. 
     Then, incubation, so understood, consists of a 
period culminating in the creative "illumination" act – 
as it was called and interpreted by Wallas[32], and 
that we characterize here as the last instance of an 
extreme and culminating privation of a process that is 
reached from a blocked state. Such state acquires 
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traits which are somewhat similar to that of a 
traumatic experience, instance that we will call “leap 
into the void”, concept which we will touch upon 
further below. 
     But this is an experience that solves the matter as 
it brings about a solution of the previous conflict. The 
incubation as privation leads to a kind of experience 
which must be unraveled in order to arrive to a 
solution –which is not always achieved, but here we 
are analyzing the favorable cases -. 
     It is the purpose of this work to chart a path to 
disengage the threads of these cognitive mechanisms 
that are supposedly present throughout different 
instances of the discovery process applied to the 
solution of a mathematical problem. This unfolds a 
more integrative approach focused on mathematical 
practice as a cognitive experiential activity. In this 
way, we present a model of the creative discovery 
process, based on recyclable stages, alternative to the 
one offered in 1926 by Graham Wallas [32], taking 
into account its criticisms, in search of a disruptive 
perspective, explaining phenomena such as 
incubation, flashes of insight, and other involved not 
entirely rational cognitive processes. 
 
 
2 THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE, 
THEOREMS VERSUS PROBLEMS: A 
PRELIMINARY ELUCIDATION 
 
To sustain our thesis, we begin by assuming the 
perspective that the discovery process can be  
characterized by a search for solutions to a problem. 
When this solution is not as straightforward as it is 
expected regarding manner, in lesser or greater  
degree is generally considered to be a unique,  
unexpected, and outstanding innovativeprocess, i.e. 
"creative".  
    However, our proposal will differ in problem 
solving from the mainstream. The reason being that it 
requires the consideration of a wide range of  
interdisciplinary mechanisms: not only logic- 
inferential structures but also epistemological 
mechanisms around the setting of prior hypotheses 
which must be torn down to accommodate innovative 
proposals. At the same time, there are also added 
psychological mechanisms intermingled with the 
mental blockages experienced after a long and 
unsuccessful work routine. In addition, also  
mechanisms appear inherent to the ways in which the 
mathematical creator manages to get rid of fixations 
to ideas previously conceived and taken as the 
working norm. Here, the idea of privation prevails, as 
we shall see below. All these elements, and some 
others which will be addressed later, are not usually 
considered in a standard approach to problem 
solving, at least not in a disruptive style, as it is 
proposed here.  
    Before we move on, we need to clarify that in the 
history of mathematics, as early as the 4th century 
AD, Pappus, in the framework of the ancient Greek 
tradition discussed two ways of conceiving the 
discovery process -process which he also called of 
"analysis"-  regressive and opposed to the progressive 
“synthesis”, considering the latter as a 
systematization of the first: problems and theorems2. 
   Even though, viewing mathematics only as a matter 
consisting of theorems and problems tends to be a 
very simplified perspective on the matter at hand, it 
helps us to understand the priority in the theorems 
which reached the philosophical perspective of 
mathematics of ancient Greece. This is a perspective 
which emphasizes the issue of proof -and 
thereby the deductive method- as the core of the 
discussion on the progress of mathematics as 
theoretical science. Mathematics, characterized as the 
science of theorem proving, is then the hegemonic 
discipline of the search for reasoning. 
   We should wait for authors such as George Polya 
(in 1945) [17] and Imre Lakatos (in 1976) [14] to re 
surface the issue of problems in mathematics and 
heuristic methods of discovery. As a consequence, 
this will generate a new tradition around problem 
solving in mathematics. Years later, in the path traced 
by the authors cited, we are closer to the current 
emergence of mathematical practice3.  
    Here, the distinction “theory versus practice” in 
mathematics is not necessarily reduced or settled in 
the complicated demarcation between theorems and 
problems. A philosophical approach underwritten by 
the latter as the core of everyday mathematical work, 
which puts emphasis on the specific activity of the 
mathematician and not so much on philosophical 
speculation sometimes detached of actual practice. 
     Both concepts are two sides of the same coin. This 
is a clear display of different, yet complimentary, 
styles of carrying on: one mostly synthetic and the 
other mainly analytic, respectively. However, the 
cognitive mechanisms that apply in one or other case, 
as far as they involve analytical or synthetic creative 
processes, may differ in content but not in form.    
Consequently, this assertion stresses that while 
synthesis consists on the creation of deductive 
strategies, in the case of analysis, analyses itself is an 
unnecessary ban and is usually ruled out. 
    The description presented above can be 
summarized by saying that there is creativity in both 
what usually is called the context of discovery, as 
well as on the systematization of deductive processes 
relevant to the context of justification. There could be 
as much creativity in finding innovative results as in 
trying to provide new deductive justifications. 
   What is relevant is that we are talking about 
smpliative knowledge in both cases: in the first one, 
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   It's worth noting the comment Eduard Glas [6] makes in 
connection with the use Lakatos makes of the discoveries 
in mathematics in a theory-centered sense, concerning 
about the “logic of discovery”, therefore, not becoming a 
true propagator of a philosophy of mathematical practice.  
because there new conclusions, previously 
unforeseen, arise that require to be warranted the 
results in a post hoc way; in the second, because 
demonstrations never before applied come out. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that mathematical research is 
and should be presented in theorematic terms. 
   In this regard, we have traces in the Alexandrine 
Greece of writings addressed to Eratosthenes where 
Archimedes4 addresses Eratosthenes expressing a 
clear, latent, demarcation between demonstrative 
methods -as it is the case of the method of 
exhaustion5- and methods created to find results – as 
it is in the case of his proposal for the mechanic 
method-, although the latter were not entitled as 
above. However, both methods show important 
creative aspects. Archimedes says:  
 
I thought fit to write out for you and explain 
in detail in the same book the peculiarity of a 
certain method, by which it will be possible 
for you to get a start to enable you to 
investigate some of the problems in 
mathematics by means of mechanics. This 
procedure is, I am persuaded, no less useful 
even for the proof of the theorems themselves; 
for certain things first become clear to me by 
a mechanical method, although they had to be 
demonstrated by geometry 
afterwards because their investigation by the 
said method did not furnish an actual 
demonstration. (Heath, 2002:12-13) 
 
   In what follows, we will describe a model of 
creativity applied in both contexts, emphasizing the 
development of an explanation that gives an account 
of the creative discoveries. We are aware that such 
discoveries are not necessarily all the types of 
discoveries that happen but in this paper we will 
focus on the ones where some not entirely rational 
cognitive mechanisms emerge. We shall keep in mind 
that creativity, according to our disruptive perspective 
and, therefore, as an experiential practice of 
privation, requires a breach in the standard reasoning. 
 
 
3 A PREVIOUS ISSUE ABOUT 
REFORMULATION OF PROBLEMS 
 
As we stated above in 1, the disruptive point of view 
is based on an incubation interpreted as privation, 
which converges to a extreme state of rational break. 
But what causes such break? The continued and 
sustained search for a solution to the problem in ways 
that ultimately are unsuccessful in some key aspect. 
Then, what happens before this obstruction? Two 
general responses are possible: a refusal -which here 
we omit as it is not relevant- and a positive response 
that offers a radical reconsideration of the problem, 
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 which will open the possibility of a solution. In this 
section, we will deal with this issue.  
       If discovery in mathematics is a form of problem 
solving, as we stipulate in section 2, apparently, every 
discovery process might occur only in relation to a set 
of prefixed initial data and goals that give rise to the 
problem’s constraints.  
    This is a central point of discussion because we 
precisely describe the final creative act or insight as a 
moment in the whole process of discovery in which 
the set of assumptions is discarded in order to sustain 
other hypotheses. This allows an innovative 
reformulation of the problem, one that now does 
provide a solution to it. 
    Therefore, the initial problem can and should be 
reinterpreted in view of the need to reflect the 
researcher’s reconstructed intentions according to the 
new demands of the task. In this regard, in relation 
to the translation of a geometric problem into 
algebraic equations, George Polya (1962) 
understands the problem solving process, even if 
it’s not necessarily creative, as a dynamic of constant 
reworking: 
 
As our work progresses, our conception of 
the problem continually changes: more and 
more auxiliary lines appear in the figure, 
more and more auxiliary unknowns appear in 
our equations, more and more materials are 
mobilized and introduced into the structure of 
the problem till eventually the figure is 
saturated, we have just as many equations as 
unknowns, and originally present and 
successively mobilized materials are merged 
into an organic whole. (Polya, 1962: 57) 
 
     Consequently, the original problem, as it was 
established in the past, will be rethought in the 
present from the provision of new tools. However, 
the idea of past memories is not appropriate if we 
understand the recovery processes as recovery 
information stored in old slots of memory. Against 
this, we adhere to the thesis of the intentional actions 
that Ian Hacking [8] outlined in the following 
terms: 
 
When we remember what we did, or what 
other people did, we may also rethink, 
redescribe, and refeel the past. These 
redescriptions may not have been true in the 
past, that is, not truths about intentional 
actions that made sense when the actions 
were performed. That is why I say that the 
past is revised retroactively.  What was done 
itself is modified. The past becomes filled 
with intentional actions that, in a certain 
sense, were not there when they were 
performed6. (Hacking, 1995: 249-250) 
 
     This task of reconceptualization, nevertheless, 
does not tend, at first, to be easy. The reason being 
that it requires that the 
mathematician is predisposed to overcome his/her 
resistance to reinterpreting the original hypotheses. It 
also calls for a broad mind and implicit acceptance 
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that certain aspects of mathematics are not 
eternal, irremovable and monotonically conservable. 
This implies “not to think of the past as fixed, final 
and determined” (Hacking, 1995:234). 
     It is frequent to hear obsolete characterizations of 
mathematics as a cumulative science. They are based 
on enduring and permanenttruths that only can 
produce more truths with the deductive machine. 
Although it is clear that we start with hypothesis, 
temporarily acceptable conjectures, until we find not 
sufficient evidence for its rejection. Precisely what 
we are talking about now is of the possibility of 
carrying out a retroactive redescription of the 
problem in question. As Hacking proclaims, 
 
We rewrite the past, not because we find out 
more about it, but because we present actions 
under new descriptions7.  (Hacking, 1995: 
243).  
 
     Hence, what appears to of relevance for the 
process of discovery is to be able to transform the 
previous background information so as to gain at 
least one of multiple new perspectives on the task at 
hand. The type of transformation we are talking about 
provides an instance of privation. 
      Indeed, to achieve a creative breakthrough in 
solving the problem, necessarily, we must go 
backwards. Metaphorically speaking, we could 
compare it to the situation of an athlete who takes a 
step backwards to thrust forward more energically in 
a race, orequivalently, in the art of the archery, which 
requires tightening the rope in order to have enough 
negative force and throw the arrow forward. 
      Here, privation is a requirement for creation, in 
the same way that when we affirm that "less is more", 
i.e., we have to create a vacuum of some kind to 
clarify before a possible contribution to the 
solution of the problem. Privation, stéresis, a term 
that Aristotle systematized as one of three basic 
principles of nature (matter and form being the other 
two), which is the absence of a given form in 
something capable of possessing it. It is not a cause 
because privation is insufficient as an element for the 
reception of the form, and this implies, within 
Aristotle's framework, that it doesn’t have 
explanatory power, but rather that it is a necessary 
condition for change, i.e. the terminus a quo of 
change. We apply here the sense of the term Aristotle 
uses in Categories to indicate some quality, habit,  
disposition or faculty that should be in some grade in 
a person, but is absent. Aristotle says: 
       
A privation cannot be affirmed of a subject 
unless its opposite habit could be naturally 
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Hacking is talking about is inserted in the preference for 
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everything, once accepted, exists forever. Instead, the 
Interventionism of Hacking allows flexibility in the 
acceptance of results, which play a conjectural, 
hypothetical and transitional role, and can, eventually, be 
removed. 
 
 possessed by it. (Aristotle, 1995, 10, 12a, 27-
34) 
 
    Here, privation is the absence of presence, with no 
positive or independent existence. Applied 
analogically to our situation, we are assuming that in 
order to find a creative solution, a mathematician 
must potentially have the ideas in a not yet present 
state, as a privation, momentarily lacking a solution 
to it. Accordingly, the momentary absence of a 
solution could be characterized as one in which 
a solution has not been found because there is no 
room for its existence yet. Similarly, in mathematics, 
when we refer to variables and imagine them as 
containers deprived of a constant that takes their 
place, i.e. that is how Aristotle outlined the notion of 
privative ideas.  
    We will see in the next section how this 
Aristotelian concept is used here with the purpose of 
explaining the less rational cognitive aspects of the 
creative process. We anticipate now that the idea of 
a break after a routine of hard work that reaches a 
saturation limit is often characterized as a stage in the 
creative process that receives the name of 
"incubation", a term coined by Wallas [32] in 
1926, which we will characterize in terms of 
privation.  
     Graham Wallas is credited as being the first to 
formulate a four-stage process of creativity: 
(a)     Preparation: where the problem is investigated 
thoroughly by observing, listening, asking, reading, 
collecting, comparing, contrasting and analyzing 
previous materials, knowledge and information 
seemingly relevant to the task in question. 
(b)     Incubation: time during which the task is left 
aside, not being worked on at a conscious level, but at 
a preconscious or unconscious one.  
(c)     Illumination: a stage where suddenly appears 
into consciousness a solution in a flash of insight, an 
“aha” experience, the “eureka” effect. 
(d)     Verification: in which the idea must be tested 
checking its efficacy to further applications. 
    Despite being a very successful model, especially 
quoted as a milestone in the notion of incubation, 
term coined by him, and of illuminative insight, its 
linearity has been largely discredited. Additionally to 
this last issue, our concern with this model has to do 
with the vague sense that Wallas attached to the idea 
of suddenness (abruptness) of insight that will be 
exposed below. 
   According to our interpretation, incubation emerges 
in the metaphorical description where the rope starts 
to stretch with the arrow going in direction of 
departure, or in the case of the athlete, just when the 
foot is going backwards. 
     The seeds of problem solving paradoxically are in 
what a conscious mind fears the most: the loss his/her 
mind, being out ofcontrol, and along with that, to 
accept vulnerability, and precisely in this aspect is 
what incubation and privation are all about, i.e. the 
capacity to surrender to one’s previous formulation of 
the problem, an experience that must be undone. It 
involves less frontal activity, which facilitates 
disinhibition of the sub-cortical regions and can 
evoke feelings of dissociation, fantasies even. As a 
consequence, this allows the subject to be 
dynamically able to engage several brain regions and 
have fluent associations, rapidly shifting between 
different neural circuits, provoking broad attentional 
focus. 
    Note that the acceptance of vulnerability is not 
without fault on the subject. According to 
Psychoanalytic theories that reinforce the idea that a 
subject is considered "normal" as long as it retains his 
sanity, i.e. exercising reason permanently (except 
perhaps when he sleeps) and assuming the attribution 
of his acts. Regarding this matter, the subject assumes 
that it should always conform to the rule of reason 
which consists in "responding to others". This 
interpretation of an individual responsibility, with 
social punishment for those who do not comply with 
that rule, seems corrupted when the subject becomes 
absorbed in thought, lapsed experiences of some 
nature, as it occurs when entering incubation. 
     It should be noted that the creative process has the 
characteristics of a paradoxical situation described as 
the dialogue between opposite ends: not just about 
privation versus creation but also a balance between 
emotion and reason.  Given that during the 
incubation phase the tip of the balance favors the 
intensification of emotions at play, at the expense of a 
slowdown in intellectual capacity. This leads to a 
stand-by state over the issue in question. 
As we shall see below, these emotions reach the peak 
of crisis during stage 3 of our interpretation of the 
creative process, state of blocked work, causing a 
near-trauma affective experience, which gives 
way to incubation (stage 4 of our interpretation). 
    The kind of trauma we are thinking about here is a 
disturbing experience; a state which accompanies 
stressful situations influenced by threats to his/her 
research, and also, a lack of capacity to 
address that threat which generates such inability to 
respond. It involves also negative emotions, 
diminution of concentration and desmotivation, 
including overwhelming anxiety, occasionally, to the 
point of being burned-out.  
   This assertion may be shocking, given the 
pejorative connotations commonly given to the term 
"trauma", and the idea of something derogatory and 
abnormal, not usually associated with people in their 
right mind. It would seem that we are describing the 
discoverers with a touch of madness, but, as we shall 
see below, madness is not necessarily a consequence 
of assuming our approach. 
    In fact, although, at the beginning, the term was 
associated in with bodily injury, later on, it acquired a 
psychological connotation, as Hacking says: 
 
Trauma took the leap from body to mind just 
over a century ago, exactly when multiple 
personality emerged in France, and during the 
time when the sciences of memory were 
coming into being. (Hacking, 1995: 183).  
 
     This traumatic instance is generated by a break in 
the continuous mental productions; situation which 
some authors think is unquestionable8. As a result, 
these “breaks allow redirection of attention from 
irrelevant aspects of the problem to the relevant ones” 
(Neçka, 2011: 669), admitting the possibility of 
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 reformulating the problem to finally come up with a 
solution for it, clearly not based entirely on the same 
problem but another highly modified one on the 
basis of mental openness. From the Gestalt Theory, 
Stellan Ohlsson says in this respect that: 
 
Restructuring means that a new problem 
arises in one’s mind, with new initial data, 
new goals, and new constraints. When such a 
change is completed, the transformed mental 
representation of the problem works as a 
fresh source of retrieval cues, thanks to which 
some relevant data, already stored in the 
long-term memory, can be used in a 
productive way. (Neçka, 2011:669-670) 
 
      In short, the reformulation of the problem is vital 
in the pursuit of its resolution when such problem is 
blocked. The key is to avoid the paralysis which the 
subject usually faces. In order to achieve a result, 
he/she will have to surrender any kind of absolutist 
claims of resolving the original problem without 
changing the starting assumptions. Which, 
paradoxically, does not mean to continue to do 
what was done previously, capriciously maintaining 
all the initial conditions of the problem, but to take 
one step back in the course of action taken before, 
which in turn will allow incubation. Therefore, 
this is a partial “let it be” reformulation (our stage 8), 
which culminates in a phase of systematization of the 
solution (stage 9), and these two stages conform the 
process of synthesis. 
 
 
4 THE PROPOSAL: A COGNITIVE 
DISRUPTIVE MODEL OF CREATIVE 
DISCOVERY 
 
On the way towards an explanation of the process by 
which incubation allows access to the creative 
insight, within our disruptive model of 
creative discovery framework, we briefly summarize 
all stages and their meaning. In doing so, we are 
aware of the fact that not all discoveries in 
mathematics can be called “creative”, but wherever 
the discovery reaches certain level, as we describe 
above, creativity is at work: 
I. Analysis: 
Stage 1: Original formulation of the problem. A 
clarification of the initial data, the goals and the 
constraints. 
Stage 2: Systematic hard work. Persistent search for 
solution. The problem solver explores all the paths at 
hand, exhausting all possibilities. As Feldman 
affirms: “It seemed as if my mind were 
designed to do nothing else” (Feldman, 1988:187). 
Or, as Andrew Wiles expresses himself referring to 
Fermat’s problem: “I carried this problem around in 
my head basically the whole time,…without 
distraction,...[like] one particular thing buzzing in 
[my] mind,…I was thinking of it all the time.” 
(Wiles, 2012). Polya also contributes to this idea: 
“‘Genius is patience’. ‘Genius is one per cent 
inspiration and ninety-nine per cent perspiration.’ 
One of these sayings is attributed to Buffon, the other 
to Edison, and both convey the same message: a good 
problem solver must be obstinate, he must stick to his 
problem, he must not give up.” (Polya, 1962: 92). 
Progressive work: to extract consequences from 
initial assumptions, working forward, i.e. taking as a 
starting point the data working its way up to derive to 
a solution. Regressive work: to search for the 
reduction of the problem (apagogé), working 
backwards, towards the data, maybe arriving at an 
auxiliary problem which we can solve.  
Stage 3: Blocked work. Incessant work slowed (and 
even blocked) by some kind of obstruction not 
determinate it yet. The scientist is struggling with the 
problem, feeling stuck, with fixed ideas impossible to 
mobilize, situation which results in a lack of progress, 
leading up to an affective impasse. The problem 
drives the researcher to an aporetic situation in which 
the knowledge previously acquired brings along 
unexpected complications9. 
Stage 4: Incubation. An impasse to “put the problem 
out of mind, while paradoxically remaining sensitive 
to stimuli and ideas that might be related to the 
unsolved problem.” (Smith, 2011:657)10. 
Stage 5: Leap into the void. The incubation’s final 
effect: an extreme case taking impact of 
implementing the incubation to the limit, reaching a 
state of absence of reason. An experience which 
increases the feeling that there is no way to escape 
from the rapid decline of the rational activity; threat 
of imminent danger upon completion of a dark cycle, 
accompanied by an overwhelming feeling of being 
dominated, feeling powerless against external forces 
beyond ourselves.  extreme dissociative state (not 
pathological), with severe emotional 
exacerbation and decay of the attentional focus, 
which in turn, results in an experience of minimum 
,or even non-existent, awareness, carrying a sensation 
of vertigo. Metaphorically , it evokes the 
dizzying fall by the edge of reason, a penetrating but 
fleeting experiential void in consciousness, as if in 
total darkness, reaching an instantaneous recovery of 
the intellectual forces, accompanied by 
an enlightening flash -the sudden emergence of an 
omni-embracing conceptual clarity- i.e. illumination, 
the next stage. 
Stage 6: Illumination. Sense of cognitive certainty 
about the problem and a solution of it. Experience of 
accessibility to the full knowledge of the problem, in 
a direct, immediate and unlimited way. However, this 
doesn’t mean that he/she has formal detailed 
information on technical aspects of the problem, but 
rather a kind of revelation about it, where the need of 
reasoning is attenuated in favour of a type of 
experiential understanding. In this regard, Polya says: 
“The solution of a problem may occur to us 
quite abruptly. After brooding over a problem for a 
long time without apparent progress, we suddenly 
conceive a bright idea, we see daylight, we have a 
flash of inspiration. It is like going into an 
unfamiliar hotel room late at night without knowing 
even where to switch on the light. You stumble 
around in a dark room, perceive confused black 
masses, feel one or the other piece of furniture as you 
are groping for the switch. Then, having found it, you 
                                               
9
 See [28]. 
10
 For an enlarged view of this topic, confront [26] and [30]. 
 
 turn on the light and everything becomes clear. The 
confused masses become distinct, take familiar 
shapes, and appear well arranged, well adapted 
to their obvious purpose. Such may be the experience 
of solving a problem; a sudden clarification that 
brings light, order, connection, and purpose to details 
which before appeared obscure, confused, scattered, 
and elusive.” (Polya, 1962: 54). 
 “After the coming of the idea we see more -more 
meaning, more purpose, and more relations. The 
coming of the idea is similar to switching on the light 
in a dark room.” (Polya, 1962: 59). 
Stage 7: Metaphoric Insight. The searcher evokes a 
metaphor-like statement, which unveils the solution. 
Patrick H. Byrne refers thismoment stating that: 
“there is an act of recognition that not only 
understands the diagram in a new way, but 
simultaneously recognizes the applicability of the 
theorem to the diagram; recognizes a ‘universal 
shown through the clear being of the particular’ ([1], 
[2], 71a8).” (Byrne, 1997:116). Polya realizes this 
fact as well: “A suddenly arising idea, a spectacular 
new element amid dramatic rearrangement, has an 
impressive air of importance and carries strong 
conviction. This conviction is expressed by such 
exclamations as ‘Now I have it!’ ‘I have got it!’ 
‘That’s the trick’.” (Polya, 1962: 60). 
II. Synthesis: 
Stage 8: Reformulation of the problem. 
Stage 9: Systematization of the solution11. 
      There may be recursions before a creative work is 
produced. This sequence of orderly steps could be 
entirely, or partly, recycled more than once, as well 
as be interrupted and reinitiated taking some extra 
time in any of its phases12. 
 
 
5 STEPS TOWARDS CREATIVE 
INSIGHT 
 
On the process to the reformulation of a problem, 
where the foundations of our beliefs are shaken, we 
cross through aporetic situations (stage 3 of blocked 
work), which usually show the presenceof repressed 
material, that must have been preconscious and needs 
to be mobilized, recapturing a trend of thought until 
we reach awareness. 
 
While any kind of routine work is easily 
achieved, any form of creative activity is 
associated with extreme difficulties and 
accompanied by a number of severe physical 
and mental symptoms. (Kris, 1964: 298) 
 
       Any released repression –and, therefore, any 
possibility of access to the solution of the problem- 
depends on the strength of the defenses used for the 
purposes of coping with the prevailing intensity 
of conflicting trauma. Later on, we arrive to freedom 
from conflict.  
                                               
11
 Stages 8 and 9 are developed further in section 2 of this 
paper. 
12
 The need for periods demanding time to process the 
problem, not just at the incubation period, is cited in 
several researches. See [19] 
    We need to remove obstacles to allow the 
emergence of new ideas:  in these instances, 
conscious voluntary effort or concentration of 
attention does not always succeed in recapturing 
elusory thought. Therefore, suspension of ego effort 
in an incubation period is at stake: “the experience of 
clarification that occurs when after intense 
concentration the solution to an insoluble problem 
suddenly presents itself following a period of rest.” 
(Kris, 1964: 313) Hopefully, after this stage, the 
investigator has preconsciously established a unity of 
context with a reformulation of the problem in hand. 
In this way, establishing links in a chain of thought 
which connect firmly together the new hypotheses 
with the solution in a logic concatenation. This 
connection fills the gap produced between the old 
hypotheses and an expected solution, fitting 
everything into a new frame of reference: 
 
In solving problems, the feeling of fitting 
propositions together satisfies the 
requirement of the synthetic function…the 
psychic concatenation, or the establishing of 
the unity of context, is due to the synthetic 
function of the ego. (Kris, 1964: 306-318)   
 
      Finally, once the solution is obtained, along with 
a sense of satisfaction with the achieved task, come a 
stage of passivity due to a relaxation from tension, as 
Kris pointed out: 
 
The feeling of triumph and release from 
tension remind the individual of the phase in 
his development in which passivity was a 
precondition of total gratification. (Kris, 
1964: 317) 
 
      This feeling of passivity is reflected in the idea, 
often sustained by creators that the solution to the 
problem, as long as it is original and characteristic of 
the individual, does not belong to them entirely. This 
feeling, a mixture of shame and alienation from 
such solution, has its roots on the lack of 
understanding of the origin of the idea, which 
generates a sensation that the result of their creation 
came to them as a work of fate, or chance. At this 
instance, the creator feels that the solution appeared 
as a result of divine providence, as if it were a magic 
or risky solution, or inspired of by muses, or even as 
if his/her unconscious was at times more powerful 
than his conscience, bringing about "unsuspected" 
solutions to his/her mind.  
    So, because of this, incubation and its final 
moment, the leap into the void as it was previously 
described here, sometimes, causes amazement due to 
the momentary loss of rational time upon the 
problem. Such loss, at first, is of an unknown length 
of time. Also, on that incubatory period, one puts 
parentheses on its responsibility to the work, thus 
giving rein to one’s imagination and releasing the 
hypotheses.  As says Kris thereon: 
 
The absolution from guilt for fantasy is 
complete if the fantasy one follows is not 
one’s own. Opportunity for discharge or 
catharsis is guiltlessly borrowed…One of the 
main effects of inspiration in primitive 
 society is that of relieving the feeling of 
anxiety and thus of appeasing the guilty 
feelings connected with creation. (Kris, 1964: 
300-315)13 
 
       This is why, after arriving to a solution, there is a 
quest of the mathematician for response by others, i.e. 
the acknowledgment by response is essential to 
confirm their own belief in their work, “and 
to restore the very balance which the creative process 
may have disturbed. Response of others alleviates the 
[mathematician’s] guilt”. (Kris, 1964: 60) 
 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS: THE DISRUPTIVE 
CHARACTER OF CREATIVE 
DISCOVERY 
 
The inflection point in our proposal consists in the 
description of the leap into the void prior to 
enlightenment, and hence, to the elucidation of the 
problem, when the intellectual decline that began 
during incubation reaches its climax. Many 
specialists agree on the premise that there is a 
remarkable change, while others argue that it 
is only apparent. Despite this fact, those who claim 
that this change is only fictitious agree that it is 
possible to trace a sequence of steps that would unify 
the discovery process entirely a posteriori. 
       Moreover, this position is what we call 
"continuism"14, opposite to ours, namely 
"disruptivism". 
Kris affirms:  
 
The work of the mind in research and 
discovery does not consist only in a 
continuous application to the quest for a 
solution. A part of the work is done in 
preconscious elaboration, the result of which 
comes into consciousness in sudden 
advances15. (Kris, 1964: 296) 
 
      The problem arises when we have to think of how 
to interpret these "sudden advances". From the 
perspective of continuism, these sudden advances are 
actually part of a long chain of previously 
existing associations but that require the creator to 
retrieve the steps of the discovery. Hence, the task of 
the researcher consists on filling the blanks caused by 
the lack of knowledge of hidden results,  
which should be unraveled. This implies that the 
solution may seem to suddenly emerge as if it was 
disconnected from the problem, but actually, in this 
view, it is mere appearance, an illusion. Thus, the 
creator must help in the completion of the process of 
tracing back the steps, the registered instances which 
were not previously modified. The creative act is the 
last step on an incremental process of 
accumulation of knowledge, only in appearance unfit 
in kind to the rest of the process. 
     On the other hand, disruptivism claims that these 
                                               
13
   See on this topic [28] and [30]. 
14
  Related scholars to this approach of creativity are, e.g., 
David Perkins, Robert Weisberg and Douglas Hofstadter, 
among others. 
15
 The italics are ours. 
sudden advances may only emerge into 
consciousness after experiencing a peculiar and 
specific kind of privation: a leap into the void. This 
plays the role of liberating the researcher from the 
obstacles to arrive to the solution. These are the very 
obstacles which were present for him/her during the 
formulation of the original problem and 
in the set of hypotheses assumed as certain for its 
resolution. 
     Thus, according to disruptivism, there is not a 
genuine continuity between previous assumptions of 
the problem in question and its solution. These are 
misleading assumptions that must not only be 
modified but abandoned entirely. They must be left 
on hold to give rise to new versions of them that are 
connected with the obtained solution but not 
necessarily with the previous hypothesis of origin. 
     Therefore, not only is there no appearance of 
disconnection, but such connection does not exist at 
all if the result is truly creative. Mind games are what 
lead us to the desire of filling blank spaces, once the 
solution is found, in an effort of intellectual 
recapitulation. 
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